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ABSTRACT The overriding principle of ballot design is that it should not confer 
any a priori advantage to one candidate over another. Ballot format should not 
determine or condition an election outcome. Yet, there is a sizeable body of evidence 
which demonstrates that in many circumstances the design of ballot papers and voting 
machines contravenes the normative assumption of electoral neutrality. In this article, 
we look at the impact of ballot paper design at local elections in the Republic of 
Ireland (hereafter Ireland). The article uses data from an experimental election study 
conducted at the local elections in Ireland in 2009. Overall the study finds some 
evidence of a primacy effect and it also demonstrates that candidates located in the 
middle of the ballot face a challenge as they receive the lowest vote shares of all 
candidates across the four replica ballots. This mid-table obscurity remains even 
when party affiliation is known.  Thus, it can be argued that candidates placed in such 
positions incur a disadvantage.  To neutralise this effect, the article concludes with a 
recommendation that a system of random ordering of ballot positions across ballot 
papers should be implemented so as to ensure that each candidate appears at each 
ballot position on an equal number of times. 
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1. Introduction 
The 2000 US Presidential election resurrected ballot paper design as a crucial aspect 
of the mechanics of voting. Hanging chads and butterfly ballots entered mainstream 
discussion of elections in a way that had not been expected. The overriding principle 
of ballot design is that it should not confer any a priori advantage to one candidate 
over another. Ballot format should not determine or condition an election outcome. 
There must be a level playing field. Yet, there is strong evidence to suggest that in 
many circumstances, the design of ballot papers and the operation of voting machines 
contravenes the normative assumption of electoral neutrality. 
                                                 
1 Address for correspondence: Dr Theresa Reidy t.reidy@ucc.ie  
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The research discussed in this article underscores the fact that ballot position effects 
exist and they are especially prominent under certain types of electoral systems and 
types of ballot structure. This is not just a technical observation to be consigned to the 
pages of election mechanics literature. Ballot paper effects raise important questions 
about political representation. Some systems provide a strategic bias in favour of 
particular candidates and this can result in distortions of representative democracy. 
Edwards (2015) argued that US states which use alphabetical ballots select candidates 
with surnames from the start of the alphabet in far greater numbers and he suggests 
that this can have substantial outcomes for political representation. Kimball and Kropf 
(2005) concluded that ballot design exacerbated racial disparity in US voting patterns 
with some types far more likely to result in unrecorded votes. Similarly, Carman et al 
(2008) found that the combination of poor ballot design and social deprivation led to 
unusually high levels of spoilt votes at the 2007 Scottish Parliamentary elections. 
Ballot design matters and it can have important consequences for the political system. 
 
In this article, we look at the impact of ballot paper design at local elections in 
Ireland. Election management is relatively moribund in Ireland but elections work 
reasonably well and there is a high degree of trust in the process (Sinnott et al., 2008; 
Buckley et al., 2015). However, resistance to change and suspicion of innovation 
often greet attempts to modify electoral practices. This theme emerges in a number of 
the contributions to this special issue (Coakley, 2015; Murphy, 2015; Farrell, 2015).  
 
In Ireland, ballot paper design procedures are set out in electoral law and are common 
across all candidate based elections; local, European, Dáil, Seanad and Presidential. 
Candidates are listed on ballot papers in alphabetical order and are accompanied by 
photographs of the candidates, party emblems, occupational information and 
residential or professional address. Research from the late 1970s and 1980s indicated 
that there were important advantages for candidates placed at the top of Irish ballot 
papers, a phenomenon often referred to as the primacy effect. The conclusions were 
clear but no action was taken at an administrative level to address this a priori 
advantage. This article returns to the question of whether the design of ballot papers 
has a conditioning effect on election outcomes. Coming nearly forty years after the 
original work, it is timely to re-evaluate the extent of the primacy effect at Irish 
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elections. Ballot paper design has changed in the intervening period and further 
questions have been raised about whether the inclusion of photographs and party 
emblems have added new dynamics to the decision making of voters (Buckley et al., 
2007). Although these issues are outside the scope of this article, it is important to 
note that the design of the ballot paper has evolved albeit with the alphabetical core 
still intact.  
 
The research uses data from an experimental election study conducted on the day of 
the local and European Parliament elections in Ireland in 2009. The experiment 
deployed sample ballot papers with actual candidates, and interviewed actual voters 
from a different local electoral area at four polling stations. The research design is 
unusual and while it presents some limitations on the extent of the statistical analysis 
of the data, it is unusual to collect data in a manner so proximate to actual election 
conditions and we see this as an important strength of the contribution. 
 
The article is structured as follows; in section two we look to the international 
research on ballot paper design to refine the hypotheses for the paper. Section three 
provides a brief contextual overview of local elections in Ireland. Section four 
outlines the details of the election experiment and the methods used in this paper. The 
results are presented in section five.  Section six discusses the results and recommends 
the introduction of randomly order ballots to alleviate any potential for disadvantage 
that candidates may incur under the alphabetical (ordinal) system of candidate listing. 
 
2. Ballot Paper Design 
Models of ballot paper design abound. Some, or all, of the following may appear on 
the ballot; candidate names and personal information; party names, information and 
logos; candidate photographs; party symbols or images; a single language or multiple 
languages. Reynolds and Steenberger (2006) trace the evolution of the design of 
ballot papers over the centuries and provide insights into the varied and unique 
formats that can be found across the world. At its core, the work on ballot paper 
design is interested in questions around how the structure, information, quality and 
colour of ballot papers may influence voters in their decision making processes. An 
important normative question dominates, do ballot paper designs deliver different 
outcomes. 
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Reynolds and Steenberger (2006) provide a useful starting point for studies of ballot 
paper design. They address four important questions; how are changes in the design of 
the ballot processed within the political and administrative system; are ballot types 
related to the type of political regime, can ballot design assist voters with literacy 
problems and finally does ballot design affect the outcome of an election. Grounded 
in a political psychology framework, their findings are particularly interesting. They 
conclude that elaborate ballots are more common where literacy levels are low but 
there is little evidence that the ballots assist voters with literacy problems. Indeed, 
they demonstrate that levels of spoiled votes are higher in places with complex 
ballots. In their final point, they conclude that ballots are a highly manipulative tool 
which can influence election outcomes. While some of the elements of manipulation 
they document might be more likely in emerging democracies, it is clear that ballot 
design in established democracies also raises interesting and potentially serious 
questions. 
 
The work on ballot design in established democracies can be organised into a number 
of strands. We provide an overview of the main points but the focus of our review is 
on ballot position effects. 
 
Candidate Photographs 
Candidate photographs are placed on the ballot in many developing world countries. 
They are generally introduced to ameliorate the effects of high levels of illiteracy and 
as Reynolds and Steenburger (2006) have argued when combined with other 
information on the ballot, candidate photographs can lead to a complex ballot. 
Interestingly, candidate ballot paper photographs are used in a small number of 
established democracies, Ireland and Portugal being examples of these. A central 
objective of the work on ballot paper photographs has been to examine the ways in 
which voters can use candidate photos as a type of shortcut to infer certain 
characteristics or traits about the candidates (Rosenburg et al., 1986; Todorov et al., 
2005; Oliviola et al, 2012). Hermann and Shikano (2014) found that impressions of 
attractiveness and competence influenced the political traits which participants 
inferred from candidate photos and Johns and Shephard (2011) concluded that the 
addition of photographs to the ballot for British elections could impact outcomes in 
5 
 
marginal constituencies (see also Shephard and Johns, 2008). With a focus on low 
information elections, Banducci et al. (2008) concluded that voters include the 
attractiveness of candidates as a factor in their decision-making. Ballot paper 
photographs are used at Irish elections and they provided the conduit through which 
this study was conducted. 
 
 Ballot Position 
The central focus of this article is ballot paper positional effects. Generally, this work 
confirms a tendency among voters to prefer candidates whose names appear at the top 
of the ballot, compared with lower placed candidates. However, within that overall 
picture, there are a number of factors which can influence the scale of the positional 
effects. First we look at the general findings on positional effects before going on to 
discuss the electoral context and the electoral system. 
 
Koppell and Steen, in a study of the New York 1998 Democratic primaries, showed 
that candidates received a greater proportion of the vote when listed first than when 
listed in any other position. Strikingly, they found that in seven of those 71 contests 
the advantage to first position exceeded the winner's margin of victory (Koppell and 
Steen 2004: 267). Koppel and Steen treat voting as a cognitive task.  “When voters are 
faced with a choice among alternatives, they will conserve resources and select the 
most accessible satisfactory option presented, even if it is not optimal…if choices are 
presented visually, as in an election ballot, the first option presented is most 
accessible and a "primacy effect" is expected…the magnitude of position bias 
depends on how many voters do not have substantive bases for choice” (Koppell and 
Steen 2004). This is consistent with psychological research on positional effects 
which has shown that if a list of random words is flashed briefly on a screen, the first 
is more often perceived correctly and more often recalled subsequently (Kelley and 
McAllister 1984: 454).  
 
The advantage of being placed in the first position on the ballot has been confirmed in 
a series of papers (Faas and Schoen, 2006; Lutz, 2010; Meredith and Salant, 2013; 
Marcinkiewicz and Stegmaier, 2015) although there is some variation in the extent of 
the advantage. Lutz (2010) examined Swiss elections using an open PR ballot and his 
results demonstrated that the ballot effect was quite strong and eclipsed incumbency. 
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He demonstrated that being at the top of the list was most significant and that by 
position three, the effect had fallen off quite a bit. The primacy effect is also 
confirmed by Meredith and Salant (2013) and they demonstrated that candidates listed 
first on the ballot win elections between four and five per cent more often than those 
placed in other positions on the ballot, all other things being equal. They also added 
that the primacy effect is more pronounced in contests with more candidates on the 
ballot paper. Looking at California, Ho and Imai (2008) reported that in primaries 
major party candidates gained three points while minor party candidates could 
actually double their vote share however, they found that at general elections only 
minor parties benefited from being placed first on the ballot.  
 
The type of electoral system in operation is an important consideration in studying 
positional effects. Pilet et al. (2012) discussed the impact that ballot structure can 
have on the constituency workload of members of parliament. However, Faas and 
Schoen (2006) pointed out that candidate position is pre-determined through party 
label in many systems so there is little that candidates can do to respond to the 
primacy advantage. However, in preferential voting systems where voters may rank 
their preferred candidate, 1,2,3, it should be expected that positional voting bias is a 
feature but furthermore, parties and candidates might be expected to respond to the 
incentives provided.  
 
The ballot paper at Irish elections is structured by candidate alphabetical order. This is 
important as it avoids some of the endogeneity problems identified by Lutz (2010) 
and found in studies using list systems where pre-determined assessments of a 
candidates’ electoral success play an important part on the decisions made by parties 
on where candidates are ranked on the ballot. PR-STV offers a pure example of 
alphabetical order where voters are in control. In their study of the 1973 Irish general 
election, Robson and Walsh (1974: 191-203) found that candidates placed higher on 
the ballot enjoyed a "distinct advantage" over their fellow candidates.  They analysed 
the number of votes gained by candidates of the same parties according to their 
position on the ballot, and found that candidates placed at the top of the ballot 
received more votes than their party colleagues. Their study also showed that position 
effects were more prominent among non-incumbents than among incumbents.  
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Subsequent research has confirmed the findings of Robson and Walsh. Marsh (1987: 
65-76) examined the impact of ballot position on election outcomes in the seven Irish 
elections held between 1948 and 1982 and concluded that ballot structure was 
important - candidates placed higher on the ballot had a clear advantage over their co-
partisans listed in subsequent positions.  Bowler and Farrell (1991) presented 
evidence of positional effects in the 1989 general and European elections 
demonstrating that when given a choice, voters seemed to prefer to vote a party ticket. 
They found that the amount of the preference schedule given over to preferences in 
favour of Fianna Fail is much higher for those who place a Fianna Fail candidate first 
than for voters in general.  They demonstrated that this was also true for Fine Gael 
voters (Bowler and Farrell, 1991).  
 
The political context is an important consideration and provides the framework within 
which voters make their decision. Following the adoption of PR-STV in Scotland for 
the Scottish local elections, Curtice and Marsh (2014) compared the operation of the 
PR-STV ballot structure at elections in Scotland and Ireland. They found strong 
evidence of alphabetical bias in the Scottish data but in contrast to other studies of 
Ireland, they reported weak positional effects from the Irish data. Still, the balance of 
academic research is persuasive. There are strong indications that ballot position has 
an impact. It follows directly then that candidates and parties might be likely to take 
advantage of these effects. 
 
Recognising the impact of name order in election outcomes, Ortega Villodres and 
Garcia de la Puerta (2004: 3-14) highlighted consequences for the working of the 
political system ‘it can affect party nomination strategies, and the conduct of electoral 
campaigns; and it can be important in influencing the composition and behaviour of 
deputies in Parliament’. Discussing the Australian case, Kelley and McAllister noted 
that in the 1960s, the Democratic Labour Party was well known for regularly 
nominating candidates with names at the start of the alphabet and they argued that 
there is reason to believe that some of the other parties were also engaged in this tactic 
(Kelley and McAllister, 1984). Spanish parties have also been known to embrace the 
benefits of name order by manipulating the ballot papers for Senate elections “to 
favour incumbents by placing their names first on the list” (Pereira and Villodres, 
2002: 246). Hamilton and Ladd (1996) went further and suggested that Republicans 
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on North Carolina election boards in 1992 strategically chose the ballot form 
expecting it to deliver positional advantages to their candidates.  
 
It is entirely logical that political parties and candidates will alter their direct 
behaviours in response to the clear evidence of primacy effects. Irish election lore is 
littered with examples of candidates changing their names to get a position higher up 
the ballot. Beverly Cooper Flynn (Mayo TD 1997-2011) is a recent example. She 
opted for a double barrelled name upon marriage but unusually decided to put her 
own surname last as her husband’s surname placed her on a higher point on the ballot. 
Nicknames have been incorporated into family names such as in the case of Pat ‘the 
Cope’ Gallagher and Sean ‘Dublin Bay Rockall’ Loftus.  Loftus was a Dublin based 
councillor who changed his name to highlight political causes but the change had the 
added advantage of raising his position on the ballot paper. Changing surnames from 
English to Irish language versions and vice versa for ballot position advantage is also 
present in popular memory of Irish politics. 
 
Tying the strands of the literature together, the first hypothesis that we aim to test is 
candidates placed at the top of the ballot will receive more first preference votes than 
those placed those lower down on the ballot (H1).  
 
Candidate Information 
McDermott (2005: 201) suggested voters use shortcuts when making their decisions 
on whom they will support in an election. She argued that voters economise, using 
political and social stereotypes to judge candidates. Voters can use basic information 
about candidates available on the ballot paper (or in election literature) - party 
affiliation, incumbent/challenger status -. She goes on to point out that the voter "can 
associate a candidate with a political and/or social group and project onto the 
candidate such things as issue positions they believe the group holds" (McDermott, 
1998:898). Popkin (1991) and McDermott (1998) examined the importance of 
demographic cues on voter decision making in low information contexts and found 
that candidate demographic cues are readily available to voters.  McDermott noted 
that a name on a ballot paper can indicate gender while a picture can inform a voter of 
a candidate's gender, race, age and physical attractiveness. Using this information, 
voters "are provided with stereotypical information that can help them choose 
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between candidates" (McDermott, 1998: 912) and McDermott concluded that voters 
did use the available candidate information to make electoral decisions.  
 
Incumbency is one of the more critical pieces of information which can be provided 
on a ballot paper. In a number of jurisdictions (Switzerland, Ireland) candidate 
occupation is listed on the ballot paper. In the Irish case, incumbents can list their 
occupation as public representative giving a clear indication of incumbency. 
Incumbency is a factor to which the literature on elections pays a considerable amount 
of attention. The evidence is mixed.  Incumbency remains an advantage in the Irish 
political context (Benoit and Marsh 2008). In Ireland turnover rates for politicians are 
low by international comparisons with more than 80 per cent of incumbents returned 
but in Britain, Norris et al. (1992) suggested that the electoral boost is so small as to 
be significant in only the most marginal of contests. Indeed, Murray (2005) argued 
that far from providing an electoral boost, incumbents may actually be an electoral 
liability, especially if they are associated with an unpopular government. Thus, the 
literature on incumbency is somewhat mixed indicating that the effect of the ballot 
paper information might vary and could be dependent upon the political context.  
 
Party information is a vital cue for voters and it is probably the least controversial 
piece of information placed on the ballot paper. In many systems, voters’ ballot 
choice is entirely restricted to a party ticket. When choice is available, there are many 
variables which can influence a voter’s decision and Campbell and Miller (1957) were 
among the earliest who demonstrated that the type of ballot influenced the extent of 
split ticket voting by voters. Several studies point towards increased participation 
when voters have political party cues on the ballot (Bonneau and Loepp, 2014). 
Partisanship is low in Ireland by international standards but it is still an important 
feature to consider (Marsh, 2007). 
 
Due to the design of the experiment used in this study, it is not possible to consider 
incumbency effects but the role of partisanship is included and is the basis of the 
second hypothesis which proposes that party affiliation moderates primacy effects 
(H2). 
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Election Context - Low information elections 
We can predict that the effect of ballot design will vary across elections as we know 
from the voting behaviour literature that electoral context matters a great deal for 
voters. Looking to the literature on second order effects, we can speculate that 
positional effects should be more likely when other cues have less resonance. A 
number of studies have focused on this dimension. Taebel (1975) argued that ballot 
placement of candidates is an important structural feature in accounting for voting 
patterns and he concluded that ballot position is especially critical in election contests 
in which the candidates are relatively unknown. Miller and Krosnick (1998: 291-330) 
showed that position effects are prominent in low information elections where party 
affiliations are not listed, when races have been minimally publicised, and when no 
incumbent is involved. Voters are more likely to select candidates placed higher on 
the ballot. Low information dynamics will be exacerbated when voters are casting 
ballots for several contests together and perhaps also dealing with initiative 
propositions or referendum questions, scenarios which are common in both the US 
and a number of European jurisdictions.  This leads us to our third hypothesis which 
proposes that the primacy effect is stronger in a low information election context 
(H3). 
 
3 Local Elections in Ireland 
Local elections in Ireland are conducted using PR-STV. Voters rank candidates in 
order of their choice, 1. 2. 3. PR-STV confers a high degree of choice on voters, they 
are able to choose across, and within, parties and, among non-party affiliated 
candidates. Since 1999 local elections are co-scheduled with elections to the European 
Parliament. This decision was taken in an attempt to improve participation rates at 
both these contests. That being said, they are clearly second order elections in the 
sense of Reif and Schmitt (1980) and turnout tends to be lower than at national 
elections. Average turnout at local elections between 1967 and 2009 is 58 per cent.  
The 2009 figure was just marginally below this average coming in at 57.7 per cent. 
The variation over the decades is evident from figure one. 
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Figure 1: Turnout at Local Elections in Ireland 
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Local democracy in Ireland is particularly weak and it is often argued that it would be 
better termed local administration. There is an imbalance in the system where elected 
officials have few real powers and tend to be subordinate to the senior appointed 
officials, especially the city or county manager renamed chief executive officers under 
the provisions of the 2012 local government reform document Putting People First.  
Localism and brokerage are central features of the political system and when 
combined with the limited powers of councillors, it delivers local elections which tend 
to be dominated by discussion of national political issues although voting frequently 
displays heavy local characteristics. 
 
The design of the ballot paper at local elections follows the same regulations which 
govern other political contests. Photographs of candidates have been placed on ballot 
papers since 1999. The decision to include photographs was informed by arguments 
that voters with literacy difficulties would be assisted in their voting. Specifically, 
photographs were also identified as a measure to alleviate a problem, specific to the 
Irish context, of many candidates of the same name appearing on the ballot paper.  
 
Research undertaken after the 1999 election confirmed a positive reaction of all voters 
to the photographs and specific support for the measure from voters with literacy 
difficulties (Lansdowne Market Research 2000). However, this research was based on 
the assumption that voters recognise their politicians or local political candidates. The 
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research did caution policy makers that the measure could strengthen a candidate 
centred bias in Irish elections. In response to this advice, a decision was taken in the 
Electoral Amendment Act (2000) to include party logos to offset any increase in 
candidate centred politics (Dáil Debates (21/2/2001). Research into voter recognition 
of politicians has undermined the assumption of widespread recognition. A survey, 
using photographs of members of the European Parliament (MEPs), undertaken after 
the 1999 European elections found that less than half of the electorate recognised 
three or more candidates after the election. The authors concluded that only a small 
number of voters were equipped with sufficient information for the photographs to be 
of assistance (Lansdowne Market Research, 2000). Almost identical findings were 
presented from the study wave taken after the 2004 elections (Lansdowne Market 
Research, 2005).  
 
The Joint Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution undertook a review of the 
electoral system in 2009 and it recommended that the ballot paper should be 
examined especially in light of potential problems with positional bias and also 
problems with the photographs. Difficulties with the party emblems have also now 
been added to this list. Ireland has a large number of non-party candidates and it was 
noticed in 2014 that voters were using the blank space where party emblems appeared 
for some candidates to mark in their preferences (Dáil Debates, 2015). Despite the 
recommendations from the 2009 review and more recent concerns, no review has 
taken place and indeed, no review is planned. 
 
4 2009 European and Local Election Experiment 
The June 2009 European Parliament and local elections in Ireland were somewhat 
unusual. The elections were politically charged as the financial crisis that befell the 
country in September 2008 had taken hold and the government of the day found itself 
facing unprecedented economic difficulties. While European Parliament and local 
elections are frequently dominated by national issues, in the 2009 election, economic 
affairs dominated to the exclusion of all else. 
 
The research presented here is taken from a unique experimental design. Four replica 
ballot papers were developed and deployed at polling stations in Cork city and county 
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on the day of the election in 2009.  The replica ballot papers were developed using 
pictures of actual candidates from a constituency in another part of the country.  
Candidate names and personal details were removed from all ballots. The structural 
and information details of the ballots are as follows: 
 
Ballot 1 - Photos in ballot order 
Ballot 2 - Photos and party logo in ballot order 
Ballot 3 - Photos in random order 
Ballot 4 - Photos and party logo in random order. 
 
As noted the candidates were from a different electoral area than that surveyed and 
candidates would have been unknown to the survey respondents. National political 
representatives are precluded from holding local electoral office simultaneously in 
Ireland under what was known as the abolition of the dual mandate. As a result there 
are few nationally recognisable figures in local politics. One of the conditions for 
receiving access to the ballot paper photographs was anonymity for the election 
candidates. Candidate photographs are classified as personal data and each candidate 
had to agree to release their image for the purpose of the study.2  In all, there were 
nine candidates on the ballot, five men and four women.  
 
The survey was administered at four polling stations on the day of the election. Two 
urban polling stations and two mixed rural polling stations were used. Survey 
respondents were asked to give their own age, gender and citizenship.  They were 
then asked to ‘vote’ for the candidates on the replica ballot papers, rank ordering the 
candidates in the same manner as they would under regular PR-STV voting 
conditions. Finally, survey respondents were asked to outline the key factor that 
influenced their first preference vote choice.  
 
In total a sample of 1201 ballots was achieved. The total registered electorate at the 
four polling stations was 8342, resulting in a sample size of 14.39%. The refusal rate 
was just over 3%. 
 
                                                 
2 Further information on the study is available from the authors. 
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There are a number of remarks that must be made in relation to the data collected. 
First, and most significant, the respondents in the ballot experiment were actual 
voters. Respondents were approached outside the polling station, after they had 
completed their voting. Second the candidates on the sample ballot papers were actual 
local election candidates. All of the data was collected on the same day. Furthermore, 
in using actual voters and candidates, it was possible to compare the results of the real 
election with those of the survey. The use of actual candidates and voters enhances 
the external validity of the research. Tables one and two provide some summary 
information on the candidates in the study under the two different formats used. 
 
Table 1  Candidate Information – Ballot (Alphabetical) Order 
Candidate Label Gender Party Affiliation 
Position 1 Male Fine Gael 
Position 2 Male Fianna Fáil 
Position 3 Female Green Party 
Position 4 Female Fianna Fail 
Position 5 Female Independent 
Position 6 Female Sinn Féin  
Position 7 Male Independent 
Position 8 Male Fine Gael 
Position 9 Male Labour 
 
Table 2  Candidate Information – Random Order 
Candidate Label Gender Party Affiliation 
Position 1 Male Fine Gael 
Position 2 Male Fianna Fáil 
Position 3 Female Green Party 
Position 4 Female Fianna Fáil 
Position 5 Female Green Party 
Position 6 Female Sinn Féin   
Position 7 Male Independent 
Position 8 Male Fine Gael 
Position 9 Male Labour Party 
 
There are three hypotheses for the research. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Candidates placed at the top of the ballot will receive more first 
preference votes than those placed lower down on the ballot. 
Hypothesis 2: Party affiliation will moderate primacy effects. 
Hypothesis 3: The primacy effect is stronger in a low information election context. 
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In section five we present the results from our analysis. We look at the candidate in 
the first position and also at the vote share outcomes for candidates placed at the end 
of the ballot. We present the first preference vote share achieved by each candidate 
and we also compare the results to the first preference share of the votes received by 
the candidates from the real election in which the candidates participated.  
 
5  Ballot Position Effects 
We begin by looking at hypothesis one, candidates placed at the top of the ballot will 
receive a higher percentage of first preference votes. Figure two presents the share of 
the first preference vote received by each candidate on each of the four sample ballot 
types. There are interesting impressions from the distribution of the votes. The pattern 
is very mixed and while there is some evidence of a primacy effect for the candidate 
in position one, the candidate in position three also does quite well, indeed as do the 
candidates in positions eight and nine. The mean vote share for the candidate in 
position one is 13 per cent but this figure is exceeded for candidates in positions three, 
eight and nine. The highest mean vote share is for position nine at nineteen per cent 
and this includes a range of 14 to 32 per cent.  
 
Figure 2: Positional Effects – % of the First Preference Vote (4 Ballot types) 
 
 
 
We now turn to what we term mid-table obscurity. The mean share of the first 
preference vote in position five is six per cent, position six is eight per cent and 
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position seven is seven per cent. The three positions have the lowest mean vote 
shares. This pattern is most pronounced in sample ballot two (figure three).  
 
Figure 3: Sample Ballot Two (Alphabetic Order: Photo and Party) 
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Another way of looking at mid table obscurity is to examine the ballot positions 
which were most likely to receive no preference at all. This data is presented in table 
three which reports frequencies. The ballot types are collapsed into two categories to 
aid presentation of the information (alphabetical order and random order). Again, 
there is a tendency for candidates placed in positions four, five and six to not have 
received any preference at all, although it also evident that position two delivers a 
very high level of no preference. 
 
Table 3 Frequencies -  Preference 1 and No Preference 
 Alphabetical Order Random Order 
 Number 1 
Preference 
No 
Preference 
at all 
Number 1 
Preference 
No 
Preference 
at all 
Position 1 125 209 38 205 
Position 2 71 297 38 233 
Position 3 115 237 64 148 
Position 4 65 258 47 211 
Position 5 32 306 32 209 
Position 6 39 297 53 191 
Position 7 46 276 35 204 
Position 8 97 210 69 176 
Position 9 104 209 112 145 
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The data in table three also confirm the overall effect that the first and last positions 
obtain very high shares of the first preference vote. Adding some nuance to the 
literature, the evidence from the experimental study is that there is a bonus for 
candidates placed both at the top and at the end of the ballot. Consequently, 
hypothesis one is accepted but with some qualification that there are advantages for 
candidates both at the top and at the end of the ballot. 
 
Turning next to hypothesis two, we compare how political party information on the 
ballot alters the overall share of the first preference vote. From figure four, it is clear 
that there are significant differences in the vote share for candidates in positions 1, 3 
and 8 across the two ballots arranged in alphabetical order. Candidates 1 and 8 were 
both from Fine Gael and they saw their vote share increase sharply when this was 
known to voters. This is consistent with the overall performance of the party at the 
2009 local elections. The Fianna Fáil candidate in position three saw a sharp drop in 
her vote once party was known again reflecting wider party performance in the 
election. 
 
 Figure 4: Ballot Position Effects – Alphabetical structure  
 
 
The pattern in the sample ballots which used a random ballot structure also reflect the 
wider party performances in a slightly different way but are still consistent with the 
overall performance of parties at the real election. Both Fianna Fáil candidates 
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(positions 2 and 4) saw their vote share reduce with candidate four experiencing a 
particularly sharp reduction. Both Fine Gael candidates also saw a small drop in their 
vote shares but the Labour Party candidate’s vote share doubled as soon as his party 
label was known (see figure five). 
 
Figure 5: Ballot Position Effects – Random structure  
 
 
In an attempt to explore the question of primacy effects and party affiliation a little 
more, we present data in figures six and seven on the parties which had more than one 
candidate in the race. This allows us to explore the effect of ballot position within 
party classifications. While there is a clear ballot position effect for the first Fine Gael 
candidate in the ballot arranged in alphabetical order when party is known (figure 6), 
the opposite occurs when the data from the random ballot structure is examined. At 
this point it must be mentioned that there is a significant age difference between the 
two candidates and it may be that the issues raised in relation to decisions on 
candidate image may need to be considered. Unfortunately, this type of analysis is 
outside the scope of this research.  
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Figure 6: Alphabetical Structure, Party Effects 
 
 
 Figure 7: Random Structure, Party Effects 
 
 
As the data is drawn from four separate experiments, there are limits on the extent of 
the statistical examination which can be undertaken. However, we can compare 
means for each ballot position across the four ballot types and this is done in tables 
four (a) and (b) for position one and in tables five (a) and (b) for position nine. 
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Table 4 (a) Comparing Means – Candidate A 
 Ballot One 
(Alphabetical, 
Photo) 
Ballot Two 
(Alphabetical, 
Photo, Party) 
Means 276.97 334.75 
F Statistic 2.723 
Sig 0.99 
Table 4 (b) Comparing Means – Candidate A  
 Ballot Three 
(Random, 
Photo) 
Ballot Four 
(Random, 
Photo, Party) 
Means 361.42 490.66 
F Statistic 8.515 
Sig (0.004)* 
 
A higher mean is reported when party information is included for both formats. This 
confirms that party has an effect and, when it is known to voters the primacy effect is 
moderated. In other words, the candidate in position one is more likely to be allocated 
a greater number of (lower) preferences ie; 6,7,8,9. This effect is statistically 
significant for the random order ballot. We also turn to the other end of the ballot and 
the analysis is repeated for candidate I. Here again, the means are higher under both 
ballot orderings indicating that party does have an impact. 
 
 Table 5 (a) Comparing Means – Candidate I 
 Ballot One 
(Alphabetical, 
Photo) 
Ballot Two 
(Alphabetical, 
Photo, Party) 
Means 243.25 384.47 
F Statistic 16.579 
Sig (0.000)* 
Table 5 (b) Comparing Means – Candidate I  
 Ballot Three 
(Random, 
Photo) 
Ballot Four 
(Random, 
Photo, Party) 
Means 277.47 324.7 
F Statistic 1.302 
Sig 0.254 
 
This analysis presented here leads to the general conclusion that party label does 
moderate ballot position effects. When the party label is known, the overall 
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performance of candidates altered to more closely reflect the outcome of the real 
election. 
 
The final hypothesis we look at is an exploration of how the primacy effect should be 
stronger in a low information election. Here we present two figures, both of which 
include data from the actual elections. Data limitations mean that only a very 
descriptive discussion is possible. 
 
Figure 8: Alphabetical Structure and real Election Result 
 
 
Figure 9: Random Structure and real Election Result 
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The sample ballots with photos only provide the closest condition we can get to a no 
information election for voters while we suggest that the ballots with party affiliation 
provide a low information context, in that candidate information has been stripped 
out. In Figure 8, a noteworthy point is that the survey respondents were considerably 
closer to the real voters when party affiliation was known. In Figure 9, the same is 
true for the candidate in position two but to a lesser extent for the other positions. 
Unsurprisingly we conclude that context matters - the more information that is 
available to the survey respondents the more closely the survey results reflect the 
outcome of the election. 
 
6 Discussion 
The findings presented here suggest that primacy effects at elections in Ireland may 
have moderated quite a bit since the early research in the 1970s. Consistent with 
Curtice and Marsh (2014) we find moderate evidence of a primacy effect across the 
four experimental ballot formats. Candidates in the first position do well but they do 
not outperform those in other positions consistently across formats. There is also an 
advantage for candidates located on the last position on the ballot. There is some 
evidence that candidates located in the middle of the ballot face a challenge as they 
received the lowest vote shares of all candidates on the four ballot variations. When 
party affiliation is introduced, ballot position effects are reduced but there is still some 
evidence of a mid-ballot obscurity.   
 
The electoral context is a vital factor and the nature of the economic crisis in Ireland 
in 2009 meant that parties mattered a great deal. The results for the ballots with 
political party affiliations replicated the disastrous performance of Fianna Fáil and the 
surge in support for Fine Gael and Labour, both of whom were in opposition at the 
time.  The more information that was presented to survey respondents, the closer they 
came to replicating the results of the real election. 
 
It was noted in section one that the overriding principle of ballot design is that it 
should not confer any a priori advantage to one candidate over another. As an 
extension of that it should not confer any disadvantage on candidates.  Ballot format 
should not determine or condition an election outcome.  Ballot papers should be a 
level playing pitch for all candidates. The phenomenon of mid-table obscurity 
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observed in this study presents evidence that candidates placed in such positions incur 
a disadvantage.  To neutralise this effect, the introduction of a set of randomly ordered 
ballot papers should be considered.  This matter has been raised in a variety of fora in 
recent years notably in the review of PR-STV by the Joint Oireachtas Committee on 
the Constitution in 2010 and again at the Constitutional Convention in 2013 when 
participating citizens were asked to vote on ‘changing the alphabetical order of 
candidates on the ballot paper’. On that occasion 67 per cent of the convention 
members were in support of such a change.  To date the Irish government has yet to 
act on these recommendations (Buckley et al, 2015).   
 
The operationalization of randomised ballots would require the development of a set 
of ballots in each constituency along the lines of the so-called ‘Robson Rotation’.  
The ‘Robson Rotation’ advises that the versions of the ballot paper produced is equal 
to the number of candidates running in a constituency to ensure that each candidate’s 
name appears in each ballot position an equal number of times.  So for a constituency 
of five candidates, five ballots would be produced along the following lines3:- 
 
Rotation #1 Rotation #2 Rotation #3 Rotation #4 Rotation #5 
Candidate A Candidate B Candidate C Candidate D Candidate E 
Candidate B Candidate C Candidate D Candidate E Candidate A 
Candidate C Candidate D Candidate E Candidate A Candidate B 
Candidate D Candidate E Candidate A Candidate B Candidate C 
Candidate E Candidate A Candidate B Candidate C Candidate D 
 
However, the introduction of randomised and rotational ballots would pose significant 
administrative challenges.  Under Ireland’s current system of electoral management 
where responsibilities are spread across a variety of agencies and arms of government,   
such a major change to the structure and deployment of ballot papers would likely 
meet with strong resistance by the various stakeholders involved.  The introduction of 
such a system of ballot papers would require detailed research and a pilot study, 
resources (both financial and personnel), voter awareness campaigns and a dedicated 
                                                 
3 This is only an illustrative example.  As noted by Hawkey (2008) positions on the 
first rotation are drawn by lot).  
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oversight and monitoring body to ensure proper distribution and usage of ballot 
papers.  In the continuing absence of an electoral commission in Ireland the current 
system of ballot papers is likely to remain.   
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